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Inducing alternative-based and characteristic-based search procedures
in risky choice
Luigi Mittone∗ Mauro Papi†
Abstract
We propose a novel experimental design aimed at investigating whether inducing individuals to use certain choice procedures
has an effect on the outcome of their decision. Specifically, by implementing a modification of the mouse-tracing method, we
induce subjects to use either alternative-based or characteristic-based search procedures in a between-subject lottery-choice
experiment. We find that encouraging subjects to search by characteristic systematically makes them choose riskier options.
Consistently with existing literature, our evidence indicates that individuals typically look up information within alternatives.
However, when induced to search by characteristic, high prizes receive more attention, leading individuals to switch to non-
compensatory heuristics and – consequently – make riskier choices. Our findings are robust to variations in the complexity of
the choice problem and individual differences in risk-attitudes, CRT scores, and gender.
Keywords: alternative-based search, characteristic-based search, risky choice.
1 Introduction
Payne et al. (1993) categorise choice procedures as
alternative-based search (ABS) and characteristic-based
search (CBS) procedures. Given a multi-attributive choice
problem, ABS procedures are procedures according towhich
the decision-maker examines the attributes within alterna-
tives. In contrast, CBS procedures are procedures accord-
ing to which the decision-maker examines the attributes
across alternatives.1 Examples of ABS procedures include
weighted additive models, such as prospect theory (Tver-
sky & Kahneman, 1992), and satisficing (Simon, 1955) and
examples of CBS procedures comprise the elimination-by-
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1Tables S1 and S2 in the supplement supplement provide graphical
illustrations of ABS and CBS procedures, respectively.
aspects procedure (Tversky, 1972) and the priority heuristic
(Brandstätter et al., 2006). In this paper we experimentally
investigate whether inducing individuals to use ABS or CBS
procedures has an effect on the outcome of their decision in
the context of risky choice.
In particular, we propose an innovative between-subject
experimental design consisting of two tasks. InTask 1, which
is common across treatments, we elicit subjects’risk prefer-
ences by using the ‘bomb risk elicitation task’ (Crosetto &
Filippin, 2013). In Task 2, we ask subjects to solve a se-
quence of randomly generated lottery-choice problems by
inducing them (in different treatments) to use either ABS
or CBS procedures. The novelty of our design lies in the
fact that, unlike in experiments studying framing effects, we
do not alter the way in which information is presented to
subjects.2 In contrast, we experimentally manipulate the
procedure that subjects use to search by proposing a modi-
fication of the well-known mouse-tracing paradigm (Payne
et al., 1993). Before outlining the methods employed in our
experiment, we discuss the related literature.
Our experiment relates to the literature on judgment and
decision making (JDM) in at least two ways. First, the JDM
literature on risky choice has investigated what model (or
class of models) better explains subjects’ behaviour (e.g.
Fiedler & Glöckner (2012)). For example, an important de-
bate has concerned whether individuals use heuristics, such
as the lexicographic heuristic, or more integrative choice
procedures, such as prospect theory, in risky choice, and
how this relates to the information search patterns detected
via process-tracing paradigms, such as mouse-tracing, eye-
2As an example, in the famous Asian disease experiment the same
information is framed in terms of lives saved and in terms of deaths (Tversky
& Kahneman, 1981).
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tracking, and decision-moving window (Brandstätter et al.,
2006; Glöckner & Betsch, 008a; Glöckner & Herbold, 2011;
Glöckner & Pachur, 2012; Su et al., 2013). Our experiment
tackles the same broad research question, but from a different
perspective, in that it investigates whether inducing subjects
to use certain choice procedures has an effect on the outcome
of their decision.
Second, from a methodological point of view, the JDM
literature has examined whether mouse-tracing methods in-
duce different information search patterns relative to open
displays, and prevents individuals from adopting certain
decision processes (Glöckner & Betsch, 008b; Johnson
et al., 2008; Norman& Schulte-Mecklenbeck, 2010; Franco-
Watkins & Johnson, 2011). For instance, Franco-Watkins
& Johnson (2011) propose the aforementioned decision-
moving window paradigm and compare it with both the eye-
tracking and mouse-tracing paradigms in a risky-choice ex-
periment, by pointing out that: ‘choice of the riskier gamble
in a pair seemed to increase for the DMW [decision-moving
window] relative to MT [mouse-tracing], and to some degree
also compared to basic ET [eye-tracking]’.3 Our experiment
makes use of the mouse-tracing method, but in a different
way and for different purposes with respect to the existing
literature. First, as discussed above, the aim of this paper is
not to investigate the nature of the decision processes natu-
rally followed by individuals, but the impact of the different
decision patterns (ABS versus CBS) that we induce sub-
jects to follow. The mouse-tracing method is instrumental
to this research question, in that its primary purpose is not
to infer information acquisition patterns, but to serve as a
treatment variable aimed at inducing different choice pro-
cedures. Specifically, different specifications of the mouse-
tracingmethod are used to induce ABS and CBS procedures.
Second, the mouse-tracing method is used in both our main
treatments. This implies that even though the mouse-tracing
paradigm influences the way in which individuals make de-
cisions, it should not invalidate our between-treatment com-
parison, thanks to the ceteribus paribus condition.
From amethodological point of view, ourwork also relates
to Reeck et al. (2017), who propose an experiment in which
subjects are induced to use integrative vs comparative search
strategies when making choices over time. They find that
encouraging subjects to search in different ways affects their
intertemporal choices.
3In the decision-moving window paradigm, information is initially hid-
den. When the experimental subject fixates a portion of the screen corre-
sponding to a specific piece of information, such information is revealed to
the subject. As soon as the subject’s eyes move away, information is au-
tomatically hidden. In their experiment Franco-Watkins & Johnson (2011)
employ the lottery datasets previously utilized by Glöckner & Betsch (008a)
and Glöckner & Herbold (2011).
2 Method
Subjects
A total of 226 subjects were recruited from a university
database of students.4 The design of the experiment is
between-subject. A total of 76 subjects were assigned to
the ABS treatment, 72 subjects to the CBS treatment, and
78 subjects to a Baseline treatment, which we describe be-
low. The experiment took place at the Cognitive and Exper-
imental Economics Laboratory (CEEL) of the University of
Trento on the 6th of April 2017 (ABS and Baseline), 13th of
June 2017 (CBS), 28th of September 2017 (ABS, CBS, and
Baseline), 22nd of May 2018 (ABS, CBS, and Baseline),
and 13th-14th of November 2018 (ABS, CBS, and Base-
line). The software used in this experiment was designed by
the authors of the paper and the CEEL manager Mr. Marco
Tecilla.
Experimental Design
The experimental design consists of two tasks. Task 1 –
which is common across treatments – elicits experimental
subjects’risk preferences by using the well-known ‘Bomb
Risk Elicitation Task’ (BRET) proposed by Crosetto & Fil-
ippin (2013), which is fully outlined in the supplement.
Task 2, on the other hand, consists of a number of lottery
choice problems. Every choice problem in Task 2 is a set
of lotteries, which is presented to subjects in one screen-
shot. Subjects are asked to select their most preferred lot-
tery within a time limit. To induce an ABS procedure, we
designed a treatment in which at every choice problem infor-
mation is hidden and subjects are faced with several buttons
– one for each lottery available at that choice problem. In
order to access information, subjects have to click the but-
ton corresponding to the lottery they intend to explore, and
the software automatically reveals the prizes and the corre-
sponding probabilities of that particular lottery only. To
explore some other lottery in the same choice problem, sub-
jects have to repeat the same operation by clicking on the
button corresponding to the lottery they intend to explore,
and the software automatically hides the prizes and corre-
sponding probabilities of the previously explored lottery and
shows the prizes and corresponding probabilities of the lot-
tery subjects have subsequently clicked on. Consistently
with the idea of an ABS procedure, in this treatment – which
we labelled ‘ABS’ – subjects are therefore encouraged to
analyse the prizes and the corresponding probabilities of a
certain lottery before exploring the next lottery. Figure S1
in the supplement provides an example of a screenshot.
4Most subjects were undergraduate students in economics. In the
robustness-check section we discuss the demographic characteristics of our
experimental subjects.
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In contrast, to induce a CBS procedure, we designed a
treatment in which – just like in the ABS treatment – ev-
ery choice problem is presented in one screenshot and in-
formation is initially hidden. However, unlike in the ABS
treatment, subjects are given the opportunity to explore the
feasible set of lotteries by uncovering one prize (and its
corresponding probability) at a time. Specifically, in order
to access information, subjects have to click on the prize
and corresponding probability they intend to explore, and
the software reveals that prize only (and its correspond-
ing probability) of all lotteries available at that particular
choice problem. To explore some other prize-probability
pair in the same choice problem, subjects have to repeat
the same operation by clicking on the prize-probability pair
they intend to explore, and the software automatically hides
the previously explored prize-probability pair and shows the
prize-probability pair that they have subsequently clicked
on. Consistently with the idea of a CBS procedure, in this
treatment – which we called ‘CBS’ – subjects are therefore
encouraged to examine one prize-probability pair across lot-
teries before exploring the next prize-probability pair. Figure
S2 illustrates an example of a screenshot and remark 1 in the
supplement further discusses the features of the CBS treat-
ment.
In both the ABS and CBS treatments subjects are free
to explore a choice problem as they wish, subject to the
treatment-specific restrictions outlined above. That is, they
can explore the pieces of information in the order that they
want, by uncovering the same item more than once within
the time limit. Unlike in framing experiments, the prizes
and corresponding probabilities of the available lotteries in
our experiment are framed in the exact same way in the two
treatments. Therefore, the only difference between the ABS
treatment and the CBS treatment is the way in which subjects
are induced to explore the choice problems. We acknowledge
that our design does not force a subject assigned to the ABS
(resp., CBS) treatment to use anABS (resp., CBS) procedure.
However, we believe that it is reasonable to assume that the
ABS treatment makes the use of an ABS procedure more
natural than the CBS treatment and, conversely, the CBS
treatment makes the use of a CBS procedure more natural
than the ABS treatment.
In order to have a third standard of comparison, we de-
signed a third treatment – which we called ‘Baseline’. In
the Baseline treatment, subjects can see all the information
available at once at any point in time and, as such, they are
not restricted in the way in which they explore the feasible
set of lotteries. Figure S3 in the supplement provides an
example of a screenshot.
Lottery Dataset
Within each treatment we varied the complexity level of a
choice problem, where by complexity we mean both the
Table 1: Attribute-based and alternative-based complexity
in the experiment.
#Attr. #Alt.
2 2
2 3
2 4
3 2
3 3
3 4
4 2
4 3
4 4
number of prizes and corresponding probabilities a lottery is
made of (attribute-based complexity) and the number of lot-
teries comprising a choice problem (alternative-based com-
plexity).5 In particular, for each complexity dimension, we
considered three values (either two, three, or four), so that
overall subjects were faced with choice problems of 3×3 = 9
different complexity levels (see Table 1). Subjects were
asked to solve two choice problems for every complexity
level within each treatment (i.e., 9 × 2 = 18 problems in to-
tal) and had 40 seconds at most to solve each choice problem.
One of our objectives was to abstain frommaking assump-
tions about the exact shape of the experimental subjects’ risk
preferences. For this reason, we constructed a dataset of
lotteries that have the property that, for a given mean return,
the lotteries exhibit increasing levels of risk. By a lottery
퐿 ′ being more risky than some other lottery 퐿, we mean
that (i) lotteries 퐿 and 퐿 ′ have the same mean return and
(ii) lottery 퐿 ′ is obtained by adding zero-mean noise to 퐿.
An implication of this approach is that any risk-averse in-
dividual always prefers the safer lottery 퐿 over the riskier
lottery 퐿 ′, irrespective of the extent to which they are risk
averse.6 Tables S3, S4, and S5 in the supplement display
the constructed dataset of lotteries with two, three, and four
prizes (and corresponding probabilities), respectively, that
we have used in the experiment. All constructed lotteries
5See Johnson & Bruce (1998) for a study aimed at investigating the
effects of attribute-based and alternative-based complexity in a real-world
risky-choice environment.
6Formally, let 푓퐿 (푤) denote the probability mass that lottery 퐿 assigns
to a wealth level 푤 . A lottery 퐿′ is a mean-preserving spread of a lottery
퐿 whenever (푖) 퐿′ and 퐿 have the same expected value and (ii) there exists
an interval 퐼 of wealth levels such that 푓퐿 (푤) ≥ 푓퐿′ (푤) for all 푤 in 퐼 and
푓퐿′ (푤) ≥ 푓퐿 (푤) for all 푤 outside 퐼 (Eeckhoudt et al., 2005, page 30).
It is well-known that a risk-averse decision-maker prefers lottery 퐿 over
lottery 퐿′ if and only if 퐿′ is a mean-preserving spread of 퐿 (Rothschild &
Stiglitz, 1970). The lotteries in our experiment are designed in a way that
they can all be ranked by the mean-preserving spread criterion.
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have an expected value of 6, the minimum prize is 0, and the
maximum prize is 12.
Choice-Problem Design
To generate the (eighteen) choice problems of Task 2, for
each subject in each treatment lotteries were drawn at
random without replacement from the constructed lottery
datasets. Furthermore, the lottery datasets used to generate
the choice problems were common across treatments. This
means that the ex ante probability that a subject faces the
very same choice problem at the very same point in the se-
quence is the same both within and across treatments. This
feature of the experimental design rules out the possibility
that our results are influenced by order effects, and enables
to make meaningful comparisons between treatments.
The way in which the lotteries were arranged on a screen-
shot was also randomised in all treatments. This means
that within each choice problem the – say – safest lottery
has an equal chance of being located anywhere on a screen-
shot. The constructed choice problems had also the property
that they contained lotteries with the same number of prize-
probability pairs (either two, three, or four).
Importantly, in all treatments of the experiment, the prizes
(and the corresponding probabilities) of each lottery were ar-
ranged in descending order (i.e., the prize at the top of the
list was the highest, the second price from the top was the
second highest, and so on). The motivation behind this ar-
rangement is that it simplifies the comparison of the lotteries
within a choice problem relative to alternative arrangements,
in which prizes are – for instance – randomly ordered. We
observe that this feature of the experimental design is com-
patible with the fact that, as discussed above, lotteries are
randomly arranged on a screenshot. We acknowledge that
arranging the prizes from the highest to the lowest can po-
tentially make the high prizes more salient due to ordering
effects. However, we also note that this feature of the ex-
perimental design applies to all our treatments. Therefore,
it is not obvious a priori the extent to which this ceteribus
paribus condition can affect our results.
Implementation
.
Subjects were invited to the lab and asked to read the
instructions.7 Then an experimenter read them loudly. Sub-
sequently, subjects were asked to first carry out Task 1 and
then Task 2. In between Task 1 and Task 2, subjects were
asked to play a ‘snake-like’ game and were rewarded accord-
7The instructions can be found in the supplement.
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Figure 1: Distribution of the experimental subjects’ risk pref-
erences elicited via BRET across treatments.
ing to their performance in the game.8 After carrying out
Task 2, subjects did a Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), in
which they were rewarded 30 euro cents for every correct
answer. Finally, subjects completed an anonymous ques-
tionnaire, received feedback on their performance in Task 1,
snake-like game, Task 2, and CRT, and were paid accord-
ingly. Subjects earned a show-up fee of e3 plus the amount
earned in the different tasks. In order to determine the earn-
ings of Task 2, a choice problem was selected at random at
the end of the experiment and the corresponding chosen lot-
tery was ‘played’. Subjects could earn between a minimum
of e3 to a maximum of e20.
3 Results
Risk Preferences
The analysis of Task 1 reveals that roughly 60% of the exper-
imental subjects are risk-averse and the remaining ones are
either risk-lover or risk-neutral, which is comparable with
previous results.9 Figure 1 displays the full distribution of
risk preferences elicited via BRET across treatments.10
8Snake is a serpent that eats everything on its way. Subjects had to pilot
the snake by using the keyboard arrows with the objective of eating as many
objects as possible. For every object that the snake ate, the corresponding
earning was 1 Euro cent. The snake-like game lasted for one minute.
9E.g. Crosetto & Filippin (2013) find that roughly 70% of their subjects
are risk-averse.
10Specifically, in the ABS treatment 47, 21, and 8 subjects were revealed
to be risk-averse, risk-lover, and risk-neutral, respectively. In the CBS
treatment, 44, 19, and 9 subjects were revealed to be risk-averse, risk-
lover, and risk-neutral, respectively. In the Baseline treatment, 46, 21,
and 11 subjects were revealed to be risk-averse, risk-lover, and risk-neutral,
respectively.
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Figure 2: Average choice riskiness measured by CRI across
treatments (with standard error mean bars).
Choices
In order to measure the extent to which subjects made risky
choices in a choice problem of Task 2, we constructed a
choice riskiness index (CRI). Consider a generic choice prob-
lem 퐴 = {퐿0, . . . , 퐿푛} containing 푛+1 lotteries that a subject
faced in our experiment. Suppose that the lotteries in 퐴 are
indexed so that lottery 퐿푖 is riskier than lottery 퐿 푗 whenever
푗 < 푖 (i.e., the smaller the subscript of the lottery, the safer
the lottery).11 Suppose that a subject chooses lottery 퐿푘 from
choice problem 퐴. Then, we defined the CRI associated with
this choice as 푘
푛
. We note that the CRI so defined lies in the
unit interval and satisfies the following three properties: (i)
is equal to zero if the experimental subject chooses the safest
lottery available; (ii) is equal to one if the experimental sub-
ject chooses the riskiest lottery available; (iii) is increasing
in the riskiness of the chosen lottery.12
Results are summarised in Figure 2. Despite the choice
analysis of Task 1 indicates that subjects tend to be averse
to risk, they failed to choose the safest lottery 100% of the
time, as the average CRI is always strictly greater than zero.
The key result, however, is that while the average CRI in
the ABS treatment is similar to the average CRI in the
Baseline treatment (0.29 and 0.33, respectively), the aver-
age CRI in the CBS treatment is evidently larger (roughly
0.47). This reveals that subjects chose in a riskier way in the
CBS treatment compared to the ABS andBaseline treatment.
AMann-Whitney test for independent samples indicates that
the difference in average CRI is statistically significant at
conventional levels (Table S6 in the supplement13). Results
11The qualification ‘riskier’ is intended in the sense of footnote 6.
12Formally, let 퐴 = {퐿0 , . . . , 퐿푛 } denote a lottery menu in this ex-
periment, where 푛 ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Assume – without loss of generality –
that 퐿푖 is a mean-preserving spread of 퐿 푗 if and only if 푖 > 푗, where
푖, 푗 ∈ {0, . . . , 푛}. That is, given a lottery 퐿푘 for some 푘 ∈ {0, . . . , 푛},
the larger index 푘, the more risky lottery 퐿푘 is. Suppose that a subject
chooses 퐿푘 from 퐴. Then, the associated CRI is defined as
푘
푛
.
13The effect size estimate for the Mann-Whitney test of Table S6, cal-
culated as St.Test Stat.√
푁
, is equal to 0.523 for the ABS-CBS comparison and,
thus, categorised to be ‘large’ (Fritz et al., 2012).
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Figure 3: Average choice riskiness measured by CRI
across treatments, disaggregated by attribute-based and
alternative-based complexity (with standard error mean
bars).
Table 2: Percentage of problems at which subjects looked
up all information – ABS(푛 = 76) and CBS(푛 = 72).
Complexity % of Problems
#Attr. #Alt. ABS(푛 = 76) CBS(푛 = 72)
2 2 100.00 90.97
2 3 97.29 86.81
2 4 94.70 76.39
3 2 98.08 87.5
3 3 98.03 84.72
3 4 93.33 84.72
4 2 100.00 85.42
4 3 99.34 84.03
4 4 92.21 84.72
Average 96.99 85.03
are confirmed by further robustness checks consisting of a
bootstrap analysis of independent samples t-test.14
We also examine whether subjects’ risk attitudes (elicited
via BRET) play a role in influencing the extent to which sub-
jects’s choice behaviour differs across treatments. In partic-
ular we decompose our sample into risk-averse and risk-lover
subjects and investigate whether there is a treatment effect.15
Statistical tests (Tables S7 and S8 in the supplement) reveal
14The procedure we adopted to conduct the bootstrap analysis is sum-
marised in remark 2 in the supplement.
15We omit to specifically discuss risk-neutral subjects for three reasons.
First, given that all lotteries in our experiment have the same expected
value, then they are theoretically all indifferent to a risk-neutral individual.
Second, the sample size (i.e., 9 subjects per treatment on average) is too
small to be able to draw meaningful conclusions. Third, we conduct the
analysis for the full sample, which comprises the risk-neutral subjects too.
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Figure 4: Average number of lookups per lottery (with stan-
dard error mean bars) – two-lottery problems, ABS(푛 = 76)
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Figure 5: Average number of lookups per lottery (with stan-
dard error mean bars) – three-lottery problems, ABS(푛 = 76)
that the difference in average CRI between ABS and CBS
treatments is significant at conventional levels for both risk-
averse and risk-lover subjects, indicating that our results are
robust to individual differences in risk attitudes elicited via
BRET.
Figure 3 displays average CRI decomposed by complexity.
Each point of the horizontal axis is a pair of numbers 푥, 푦
that captures the complexity level of the corresponding class
of choice problems, where 푥 measures attribute-based com-
plexity, and 푦 measures alternative-based complexity, with
푥, 푦 ∈ {2, 3, 4}. Figure 3 indicates that the general results
outlined above continue to hold. That is, (i) in the CBS
treatment subjects chose in a riskier way than in the other
treatments; (ii) there is no systematic difference in subjects’
behaviour between ABS and Baseline. In addition, Figure 3
suggests that our findings are generally robust to variations in
both attribute-based and alternative-based complexity. The
tests (Table S9 in the supplement) confirm this finding by
indicating that the difference in CRI between ABS and CBS
treatments is statistically significant at choice problems of
most complexity levels.
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Figure 6: Average number of lookups per lottery (with stan-
dard error mean bars) – four-lottery problems, ABS(푛 = 76)
Information Search
Table 2 reports the percentage of problems at which the ex-
perimental subjects looked up all the information available at
least once in the ABS and CBS treatments for each complex-
ity level.16 Results indicate an overall tendency of subjects
assigned to the ABS treatment to explore more information
relative to subjects assigned to the CBS treatment. However,
this tendency is never dramatically strong, as the average
percentages of problems at which subjects fully explored the
available information are 96.99% and 85.03% for the ABS
and CBS treatments, respectively. This finding rules out the
possibility that the results of our choice analysis are driven
by subjects disregarding important pieces of information in
either treatment. These results are confirmed by a between-
treatment analysis of the cumulative percentage of choice
problems at which subjects looked up at least a certain por-
tion of the available information (see Tables S10, S11, and
S12 in the supplement). We also checked whether there is
a statistically significant difference between the frequency
with which subjects look up all information available in the
ABS and CBS treatments. Statistical tests (Tables S13, S14,
and S15 in the supplement) indicate that this is not generally
the case.
The diagrams of Figures 4, 5, and 6 display the aver-
age number of lookups per lottery in the ABS treatment
for choice problems with two, three, and four lotteries, re-
spectively. Note that – within each diagram – information
search data are further decomposed by complexity in terms
of the number of prize-probability pairs lotteries are made
of. Results indicate that at choice problems comprising two
lotteries the number of lookups is evenly distributed between
16Recall that in all treatments each subject solved 2 choice problem per
each complexity level, i.e., 18 problems in total. Due to an unintended
mistake in the software, ten experimental subjects in the ABS treatment did
not solve exactly two problems per complexity level. However, the total
number of problems they solved was still 18. The mistake did not seem to
affect the results.
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Figure 7: Average number of lookups per prize-prob.
pairs (with standard error mean bars) – two-prize problems,
CBS(푛 = 72)
the riskier and the safer lottery and there is no clear pattern
(Figure 4). In contrast, at problems comprising three or four
lotteries (Figures 5 and 6), the experimental subjects looked
up more often the safer lottery. Moreover, the average num-
ber of times they looked up a lottery seems to be negatively
correlated with the riskiness of the lottery itself. We con-
ducted a Pearson’s Chi-Square goodness-of-fit test aimed
at studying the distribution of total lookups across lotteries
characterised by different riskiness levels. Specifically, we
compared the distribution of total lookups across lotteries
with a benchmark consisting of a uniform distribution. The
resulting evidence is weakly supportive, in the sense that we
could reject the null hypothesis of no difference for certain
complexity levels only (Table S16 in the supplement).
The diagrams in Figures 7, 8, and 9, on the other hand,
display the average number of lookups per prize-probability
pair in the CBS treatment for choice problems with two,
three, and four prize-probability pairs, respectively. Note
that – within each diagram – information search data are fur-
ther decomposed by complexity in terms of the number of
lotteries available within a choice problem. Results indicate
that at choice problems comprising two prize-probability
pairs subjects looked up more often the high prize (Fig-
ure 7). Figures 8 and 9 suggest that at choice problems
comprising three and four prize-probability pairs, subjects
looked up more often the second-highest prize, followed by
the highest/second-lowest prize, with the lowest prize being
explored the least number of times. We conducted a Pear-
son’s Chi-Square goodness-of-fit test aimed at examining
the distribution of the total number of lookups across prize-
probability pairs. In particular, like for the ABS treatment,
we compared the distribution of the total number of lookups
across prize-probability pairs with a benchmark consisting
of a uniform distribution. We could reject the null hypothesis
of no difference at problems of all complexity levels, indi-
cating that subjects systematically explored more often the
highest/second-highest prize (Table S17 in the supplement).
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Figure 8: Average number of lookups per prize-prob. pairs
(with standard error mean bars) – three-prize problems,
CBS(푛 = 72)
Table 3: Experimental subjects’ individual characteristics –
Descriptives.
N Min Max Mean St.Dev.
Gender(F=1) 226 0 1 0.49 0.501
Age 226 18 30 21.53 1.921
CRT 226 0 3 1.89 1.177
BRET 226 5 99 43.68 17.747
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Figure 9: Average number of lookups per prize-prob.
pairs (with standard error mean bars) – four-prize problems,
CBS(푛 = 72)
Robustness Checks
Table 3 presents the summary statistics of the individual
characteristics of this study’s experimental subjects, such as
gender, age, CRT score, and BRET (number of collected
boxes). Consistently with existing evidence, we find that fe-
male subjects tend to bemore risk-averse (Croson&Gneezy,
2009) and score worse in the CRT (Frederick, 2005) than
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male subjects.17 We also detect a positive correlation be-
tween BRET and CRT scores implying that subjects that
correctly answer relatively many questions in the CRT are
less risk-averse, which is also in line with previous results
(Cueva et al., 2016)18, and identify no age effects (see Ta-
ble S18 in the supplement.) Therefore, a potential issue
in our experiment could given by the fact that subjects in
the ABS treatment chose in a safer way than subjects in
the CBS treatment, simply because of gender imbalances
across treatments. Statistical tests (Tables S19 and S20 in
the supplement) confirm that the differences in CRI between
ABS and CBS treatments are statistically significant at 1%
level for both female and male subjects, respectively, indi-
cating that our results are robust to gender effects.
4 Discussion
We conduct a between-subject lottery-choice experiment
aimed at examiningwhether inducing individuals to useABS
or CBS procedures has an effect on the outcome of their de-
cision, by implementing a modification of the mouse-tracing
paradigm. By controlling for risk preferences and CRT, we
find that inducing characteristic-wise search systematically
makes individuals choose riskier options. Our results are
robust to variations in the complexity of the choice problem
and gender effects. The information search analysis reveals
that subjects (i) consistently look up all the available infor-
mation when induced to use both ABS and CBS procedures,
(ii) tend to look up more often the safest lottery when in-
duced to use an ABS procedure, and (iii) systematically look
up more often the best outcomes when induced to use a CBS
procedure.
By combining the choice and information search analyses,
the following picture tends to emerge. When not induced to
search in any particular way, subjects typically use a com-
pensatory procedure. A compensatory (resp., noncompen-
satory) choice procedure is a procedure according to which
individuals make (resp., avoid) tradeoffs between different
characteristics (Payne et al., 1993). This observation is sup-
ported by the fact that (a) there is no systematic difference in
the way in which subjects choose in the ABS and Baseline
treatment, (b) subjects tend to look up more often the safer
lotteries in the ABS treatment, which indicates that subjects
explore information in a way that is consistent with their risk
preferences elicited via BRET, and (c) existing JDM liter-
ature shows that individuals tend to rely on compensatory
choice procedures when dealing with risky choice (Birn-
baum & LaCroix, 2008; Ayal & Hochman, 2009; Glöckner
17The evidence that female subjects are more risk-averse than male sub-
jects has recently been challenged (Nelson, 2016).
18See Lilleholt (2019) for a meta analysis on the relationship between
cognitive ability and risk aversion.
& Herbold, 2011).19 In contrast, when subjects are induced
to use CBS procedures, their behaviour evidently changes in
terms of both information search and choice. In particular,
inducing characteristic-wise search makes the best outcomes
more salient, which is evidenced by the fact that subjects sys-
tematically explored more often the highest/second-highest
prizes in the CBS treatment. Given that in our experiment
the best outcomes are associated with the riskiest lotteries,
subjects end up choosing riskier options. Therefore, unlike
in the ABS treatment, in the CBS treatment subjects’ in-
formation search and choice behaviour is consistent with a
noncompensatory procedure, such as the ‘max−max’ rule.
To the best of our knowledge, our experimental design is
novel and, therefore, our results are necessarily exploratory.
We can nonetheless draw a few conclusions from our exper-
iment. First, if the extent to which individuals make risky
choices can be manipulated by inducing them to search in
certain ways – like our experiment indicates -, then our re-
sults are of significant importance to the design of decisions
that involve risk. For example, the JDM literature on framing
has shown that manipulations of the reference point typically
result in preference reversals (Kühberger, 1998). Our results
complement this literature by indicating that – likewise –
manipulating the procedure that subjects use to search may
result in subjects making riskier/safer choices.
Second, in rational and boundedly rational models of
choice, the way in which attention is distributed over prizes
and probabilities is an implication of the choice procedure
used by the decision-maker. For example, for a decision-
maker using a weighted additive model, the prizes (and
corresponding probabilities) approximately receive an equal
amount of attention. In contrast, alternative classes of mod-
els, such as drift diffusion models (Krajbich et al., 2010), as-
sume that attention is a primitive element that ‘plays an active
role in constructing the decision’ (Orquin & Mueller Loose,
2013). From a conceptual point of view, our experiment
provides evidence in support of the latter view, because it
directs subjects’ attention by inducing them to search in cer-
tain ways, and shows that such manipulation effectively in-
fluences choices.
Third, online shopping websites, such as comparison
shopping websites and product configurators, induce con-
sumers to use certain choice procedures. For example, a
comparison shopping website typically requires consumers
to specify a set of desirable attributes that their favourite
product should possess. Consistently with a CBS proce-
dure, the comparison shopping website shortlists the set of
available products by eliminating all those alternatives that
do not meet the specified requirements. Given that our ex-
periment provides evidence that inducing individuals to use
certain choice procedures has an effect on the outcome of
19See also Johnson et al. (2008), who argue that the observed frequency
of probability-prize transitions in their experiment is not consistent with the
priority heuristic (Brandstätter et al., 2006).
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 15, No. 3, May 2020 Inducing ABS and CBS Procedures in Risky Choice 379
their decisions, our findings may be relevant to economists,
policy-makers, and financial regulatory bodies too (Thaler
& Sunstein, 2008).
Our work can be extended in at least three ways. First,
as discussed in the methods section, in all treatments of our
experiment, prizes (along with corresponding probabilities)
are arranged in descending order. In the light of the interpre-
tation offered above, this feature of the experimental design
may have made the high prizes more salient in the CBS treat-
ment leading subjects tomake riskier choices (because in our
experiment high prizes are associated with riskier lotteries).
One way of verifying whether this interpretation is correct
would be to re-run the same experiment bymanipulating such
ordering. For example, an intriguing modification could be
to arrange the prizes in ascending order. It could well be the
case that subjects still use a noncompensatory procedure in
the CBS treatment, but – instead of using a max−max-like
rule – they switch to a max−min-like rule, because arrang-
ing the prizes from the lowest to the highest makes the low
prizes more salient and, therefore, subjects end up choosing
the safest options.
Second, we would like to run further variations of our
experiment, such as changing the risk-preference elicitation
method and implementing a within-subject design. In par-
ticular, as far as the latter modification is concerned, it would
be interesting to investigate whether inducing subjects to go
through both treatments reduces the magnitude of the iden-
tified effect (Druckman, 2001).
Third, as discussed above our experiment has relevant
policy applications to online retailing. For example, the
UK Financial Conduct Authority states: ‘Price comparison
websites have changed the way consumers shop for insurance
and the way firms design, price and distribute their products.
They can save people time and provide themwithmore choice
– however, we want to be sure that consumers aren’t being
misled into believing they are buying the best product when
they may not be.’ (Financial Conduct Authority, 2013).
Given the real-world importance of our results, we intend
to investigate whether inducing individuals to use certain
choice procedures affects the outcome of their decisions in
the context of a field experiment.
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